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Abstract
Recent research in contract theory on the eﬀects of behavioral biases implicitly
assumes that they are stable, in the sense of not being aﬀected by the contracts
themselves. In this paper, we provide evidence that this is not necessarily
the case. We show that in an insurance context, being insured against losses
that may be incurred in a real-eﬀort task changes subjects' self-conﬁdence.
Our novel experimental design allows us to disentangle selection into insurance
from the eﬀects of being insured by randomly assigning coverage after subjects
revealed whether they want to be insured or not. We ﬁnd that uninsured sub-
jects are underconﬁdent while those that obtain insurance have well-calibrated
beliefs. Our results suggest that there might be another mechanism through
which insurance aﬀects behavior than just moral hazard.
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1 Introduction
Self-assessments and beliefs matter in decision making and contract design. Opti-
mal decisions depend on correct self-assessments and well-calibrated beliefs. One
important example is self-conﬁdence in own ability and performance. In particular,
overconﬁdence has been established as a relevant aspect in individual's economic be-
havior. For example, overconﬁdence has been found to predict excess market entry of
entrepreneurs (Camerer and Lovallo, 1999), risky investment decisions of CEOs (Mal-
mendier and Tate, 2005), and speculative trading (Scheinkman and Xiong, 2003). In
the context of insurance, Sandroni and Squintani (2007) consider the Rothschild and
Stiglitz (1976) model in the presence of overconﬁdent individuals. They ﬁnd that if
the share of overconﬁdent types in the population is large enough, compulsory insur-
ance is not Pareto-optimal anymore. It follows that overconﬁdence as a behavioral
inclination has important implications for contract design in many settings (see for
example Sautmann, 2013, De la Rosa, 2011 and Santos-Pinto, 2008).
While the majority of papers focuses on the case of overconﬁdence, situations in
which individuals are underconﬁdent are just as researched (Hoelzl and Rustichini,
2005; Clark and Friesen, 2009; Moore and Cain, 2007; Sautmann, 2013; Benoît et al.,
2015; De la Rosa, 2011; Sandroni and Squintani, 2007; Sautmann, 2013). Imperfect
self-conﬁdence calibration relates to many eﬀects observed in human decision making.
However, a general interpretation of the literature on self-conﬁdence is that over-
or underconﬁdence are comparably stable traits, at least within a certain decision
environment. That is, one can be overconﬁdent when driving and underconﬁdent
with math tasks, but overconﬁdence when driving should not be aﬀected by the
color of the car.
This paper provides evidence for self-conﬁdence to be malleable in a setting that
has relevant implications. Our focus here is on over- and underplacement. Larrick et
al. (2007) deﬁne the degree of an individual's overplacement as the diﬀerence between
her perceived and actual percentile in the distribution of performance within a group.
It diﬀers from other concepts of overconﬁdence in that it depends on the believed
performance of others. We show in a laboratory experiment that self-placement
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depends on whether people acquire insurance or not. While insurance in our setup
partially covers potential losses from bad performance in a real-eﬀort task, it should
be unrelated to self-placement for rational decision makers. At the same time, we
ﬁnd no evidence for more overconﬁdent individuals choosing more or less insurance
in the ﬁrst place.
More speciﬁcally, we implement an experimental design that allows us to cleanly
disentangle eﬀects from the incentives provided by the insurance contract from eﬀects
coming from selection into the contract. Before attempting the real-eﬀort task,
individuals are given the choice to buy the insurance contract. Conditional on this
choice, actual insurance status is randomized, i.e. whether one obtains insurance
or not is based on a random draw, and individuals are informed about true their
insurance status throughout the experiment. Our design is similar to the one used
in a credit market ﬁeld experiment by Karlan and Zinman (2009). Their idea is to
attract borrowers with an advertised interest rate and, conditional on showing up
in the lenders oﬃce, to randomize the actual interest rate. However, Karlan and
Zinman (2009) are not able to impose an interest rate that is higher than the one
advertised, as borrowers could simply walk out of the experiment. In a laboratory
experiment, by design there is no attrition. This allows us to assess whether the
eﬀect of insurance on relative self assessment only comes from feeling (un-)lucky
when actually (not) receiving it - remember, insurance status is based on a random
draw - or whether there is another mechanism that is able to explain the eﬀect.
A related design is used by Bó et al. (2010), who let individuals vote on a policy
that allows punishment for defection in a prisoners dilemma, but then randomize the
actual implementation of the policy (see also Sutter et al., 2010).
Our real-eﬀort task involves the forecasting of numbers with the help of two cue
values (Brown, 1998; Vandegrift and Brown, 2003; So et al., 2017). This task fulﬁlls
two requirements for our purpose of creating a realistic insurance setting. First, the
ability for forecasting, which might in the present case be related to math skills,
varies suﬃciently in the sample to create diﬀerent levels of conﬁdence in own ability.
Second, the participant's eﬀort can inﬂuence the precision of their forecasts and thus
their relative performance. Schram and Sonnemans (2011) also consider insurance
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choice by varying various parameters such as the number of available contracts.
However, in their setting, losses occur without a subject's inﬂuence, which may not
be realistic for some insurance contracts such as car insurance. Previous experiments
studied insurance choice with exogenous loss in various settings, see for example
Ganderton et al. (2000) and Laury et al. (2009). Our design naturally exhibits
features of insurance markets outside the laboratory such as adverse selection and
moral hazard.
Selfplacement is measured as the diﬀerence in an individual's self-assessed and
true performance rank among all participants within the experimental session. The
elicitation of the self-assessed rank is incentivized by rewarding accuracy. We ﬁnd
that, on average, insured individuals have well-calibrated beliefs about their ability
relative to others, while those individuals that do not have insurance underplace
themselves. These results are in line with experiments by Clark and Friesen (2009)
and Murad et al. (2016), who argue that the use of real-eﬀort tasks and incentivized
conﬁdence elicitation leads to a lack of overconﬁdence which is generally observed in
"better-than-average" predictions. Moore and Cain (2007) and Hoelzl and Rustichini
(2005) ﬁnd that subjects tend to underplace themselves in tasks that are perceived
as diﬃcult and where performance is low in absolute terms, which is in line with our
setup.
Our contribution is threefold. First, we show that individuals' self-conﬁdence can
be aﬀected strongly by contracts. While in its generality, this result is probably not
too surprising, its impact on our insurance application bears relevant implications 
just imagine that drivers become relatively more overconﬁdent after being insured.
While contract design has started to take behavioral biases into account (K®szegi,
2014), we are not aware of any existing model that would be consistent with our
main ﬁnding. Second, we experimentally study assumptions made on the selection
mechanism into contracts based on presumably stable traits such as self-conﬁdence
calibration (see for example Sandroni and Squintani (2007, 2013)). This paper thus
speaks to a broader literature that studies sorting into contracts based on behavioral
biases and preferences (Larkin and Leider, 2012; Dohmen and Falk, 2011). Finally,
we add experimental evidence to decision making in a behavioral insurance context
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in which own eﬀort instead of a random device determines losses (Browne et al.,
2015). We believe that such a setup adds to the external validity of our results for
certain insurance classes.
2 Experimental Design
We start by describing the general procedure in our experiment, the real eﬀort task
and then the insurance decision. Monetary payoﬀ was based on points, converted to
euros at a ﬁxed and pre-announced exchange rate. Participants received an endow-
ment of 100 points, equal to EUR 10. The show-up fee for participants was EUR 4.
The experiment was computerized with the help of z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007), and
participants were invited with the organizational software ORSEE (Greiner, 2015).
2.1 Experimental Procedure
All steps in the experimental setup were known in advance and common knowledge
among participants. However, we did not announce that we would elicit assessment
of own relative performance after the real-eﬀort task and insurance decision. The
experiment consisted of three parts, and participants were aware of the existence
of the three parts from the start of the experiment. They did, however, not know
anything about the content of the following part until the end of the previous part. In
the following, we just report results from the ﬁrst part.1 The experimental procedure
for the relevant stages is illustrated in Figure 2.1, along with the variables generated
at each stage. We explain the details for each stage below and in the subsequent
sections.
In the ﬁrst stage, subjects received a sheet of paper with ten examples of solutions
in the real-eﬀort task. The real-eﬀort task was a forecasting task, and participants
saw realized values of Y , W1 and W2, which could be studied for ﬁve minutes, on
the example sheet. A pen was provided, and participants were allowed to take notes,
1The second part consisted of a set of lottery decisions; the third part was a short survey on
relevant experience with insurance. Experimental instructions for the ﬁrst part are provided in
Appendix 5, and screenshots of steps 2 to 6 of the procedure can be found in Appendix 5.
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which was done frequently. The second stage consisted of ﬁve practice rounds (ﬁve
forecasts) with feedback on individual performance. These practice rounds were not
incentivized, but there was an implicit incentive in the form of a potential information
gain regarding one's own ability in this task. In the third stage, individuals had to
decide whether they wanted to buy the insurance for the upcoming payoﬀ-relevant
rounds or not. An on-screen calculator could be used at this point. The fourth stage
randomized actual insurance receipt, and the choice made in stage 3 was realized
with 70% chance. Thus, if a subject did not want to buy insurance, there was still
a 30% chance that she got the insurance and that she had to pay the premium.
Conversely, there was an equally large chance to not receive insurance, although the
subject wanted to buy it. This creates a 2 by 2 matrix of possible outcomes shown
in table 2.1. The probability of 70% was chosen trading-oﬀ incentive-compatibility
and statistical power. A message informed participants about the realized insurance
status. The message stayed on the screen throughout the following ten payoﬀ-relevant
rounds of the real-eﬀort task in stage 5.
After the ten rounds of the real-eﬀort task were completed, we elicited self-
assessed performance in stage 6. Remember that this stage was not announced
in the instructions. Individuals were asked to think about their average performance
in the previous ten rounds and should indicate which rank they think that they
hold in their respective session. The person with the lowest average forecasting error
would take the ﬁrst rank, the one with the second-lowest the second rank, and so
on. At this point, subjects had not received any feedback on their or other partic-
ipants' performance. Guessing the rank correctly earned 10 additional points, and
a deviation of plus or minus one from the realized rank earned 5 additional points.
We chose to measure conﬁdence in performance after the task, instead of before the
task, in order to avoid hedging behavior and possible priming eﬀects. Asking in-
dividuals about their relative performance to others before the task could give the
wrong impression of a competitive environment, which we neither consider in this
paper, nor is it common in an insurance context. We are well aware of the fact
that linear incentives when eliciting beliefs have their limitations (see, Gächter and
Renner, 2010; Trautmann and Kuilen, 2015), but for our case it seems a good com-
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Figure 2.1: Experimental procedure and deﬁnition of variables.
promise between validity and straightforward implementation. Between stages 6 and
7, the second and third parts of the experiment took place. In stage 7, one of the
ten real-eﬀort task rounds was randomly drawn by the computer, and subjects were
informed about their performance and earnings in this round. They also learned how
much they earned from the ranking guess. At the end of the experiment, individuals
answered a standard demographic questionnaire and were paid out in private.
Insurance actual
status yes no Total
yes 68 41 109
choice
41% 25%
no 13 45 58
8% 27%
Total 81 86 167
Table 2.1: Sample distribution
2.2 More Information on the Real-eﬀort Task
We used the forecasting task by Brown (1998), Vandegrift and Brown (2003), and So
et al. (2017). Participants are asked to enter the price Y of a ﬁctitious stock whose
price they had to predict from two cue values W1 and W2. The true relationship of
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Y and the two cues was given by
Y = 50 + 0.3W1 + 0.7W2 + e,
where W1,W2 ∼ U(0, 250) and e ∼ N(0, 5). Y was rounded to the nearest integer.
Individuals knew that there was a potential constant, but did neither know that the
function was linear, that the weights added to one, nor that there was a random error
term e. During the task, individuals where shown W1 and W2 on the screen and had
60 seconds every round to enter their forecast Yˆ into a box and click OK (see ﬁgure
B.4 in the Appendix). The remaining time was always displayed on screen. There
were no incentives for speed, but after 60 seconds without any input the program
would skip to the next round, automatically creating a no-input. We introduced a
penalty to avoid this, and the details are described in the next section. From the
forecasting input we derived the error in each forecast, which is given by the absolute
diﬀerence between the true and the predicted value of Y :
error = |Y − Yˆ |
2.3 Insurance
Based on a pilot of the real-eﬀort task, we set the insurance premium to 22.5 points,
with a coverage rate of 65%. Remember that only one round was payoﬀ-relevant, i.e.
the insurance was valid for all rounds. Earnings from the task are
earningsno = 100− error
for individuals that did not get the insurance and
earningsin = 100− error × (1− 0.65)− 22.5
for those that did. Thus, insurance covered 65% of the loss from the absolute diﬀer-
ence between the true and the predicted value of Y . Notice that we capped losses at
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the zero earnings boundary. As a consequence, there were no losses from this part
of the experiment unless a participant had not entered any forecast at all for the
randomly chosen round and was insured. In that case, the participant would have
to pay the insurance premium of 22.5 points from her show up fee. This happened
only once.
2.4 Experimental Participants
We conducted seven sessions in November 2015 in the MELESSA laboratory at the
University of Munich. In total, 167 subjects participated and earned on average EUR
12.50 in a bit more than one hour per session. Participants were mainly students
from various ﬁelds of study, with 33% from economics or business, 18% from life
sciences or engineering and 13% from humanities. Almost 60% of participants were
female, and age ranged from 18 to 43, with an average of 22.
3 Results
3.1 Descriptive Results on Self-Placement and Insurance Choice
We ﬁrst look at a set of descriptive results. Our variable of interest is rankdiﬀ, the
diﬀerence between the individual's actual and guessed ranks as entered in stage 6 of
the experiment:
Rankdiff = TrueRank −GuessedRank.
A positive value indicates overplacement, where higher values imply stronger over-
placement. A similar variable has been applied by Sautmann (2013), who uses the
diﬀerence between predicted and actual scores in trivia quizzes as her measure for
overconﬁdence. The mean of rankdiﬀ in our study is -1.37 (which is signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero at the 5% level), indicating slight underplacement, on average.
The distribution of rankdiﬀ is shown in ﬁgure 3.1. The average underconﬁdence
result is in line with Hoelzl and Rustichini (2005) and their task-speciﬁc explana-
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tion. However, there exists considerable variation of rankdiﬀ in our sample on the
individual level and when comparing treatments. An alternative measure is a simple
indicator variable for overconﬁdence. It takes on the value one if rankdiﬀ is larger
than zero, and the value zero otherwise. The entire sample has a share of 38.32%
overconﬁdent individuals according to this measure.
Remember that we can distinguish between four insurance outcomes, indicated
by the variables HasInsurance and WantsInsurance. The variable HasInsurance de-
scribes the true insurance status of an individual in the real-eﬀort task, and it is
randomized. The variable WantsInsurance describes the individual's initial choice
for or against insurance, and it is endogenous in the sense that it may correlate with
any observed or unobserved individual characteristics such as gender, age and risk
attitude. Conditional on insurance choice (=WantsInsurance), HasInsurance identi-
ﬁes the incentive eﬀects of the insurance contract. Conditional on actual insurance
status (=HasInsurance), WantsInsurance identiﬁes selection eﬀects, i.e. diﬀerences
between individuals who wanted insurance and those who did not.
Table 3.1 displays means and standard deviations of rankdiﬀ by insurance out-
come. Table A.1 in the Appendix contains p-values of t-tests within every cell of
table 3.1 whether the mean of rankdiﬀ is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. In ad-
dition, table A.2 displays p-values of pairwise, two-sided Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney
tests for diﬀerences in rankdiﬀ between all experimental groups. We observe strong
and highly signiﬁcant underplacement without insurance. There is, however, also
signiﬁcant underplacement for those who did not want insurance, when we pool
observations for those who ended up with insurance and those who did not.
Two-third (109 out of 167) of individuals wanted to buy the insurance. We
can investigate which individual characteristics predicted insurance choice. Table
3.2 shows mean values of these variables by insurance choice status and in the full
sample. Individuals who made larger errors in the practice rounds were more likely
to want insurance, which is in line with standard predictions of adverse selection
models. Insurance pays oﬀ is a dummy equal to one if the forecasting error in
a practice round was larger than 22.5/0.65=34.62, which is the break-even point
(error) of the insurance for a fully rational risk-neutral decision maker. There is a
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Wants Insurance=1 Wants Insurance=0 Total
Has Insurance=1 0.088 -0.46 -2.01
(7.39) (6.00) (7.67)
Has Insurance=0 -2.88 -2.46 -1.03
(6.99) (7.96) (7.41)
Total -2.66 0.00 -1.37
(7.56) (7.23) (7.50)
Table 3.1: Mean and standard deviation of Rankdiﬀ
large diﬀerence (20%-points) between those who wanted insurance and those who did
not. However, buying insurance would still have paid oﬀ in 40% of rounds for those
that did not want to buy insurance. Females more frequently wanted insurance than
males and so did younger individuals.
Did not want insurance Wanted insurance Total
Error in practice rounds 41.52 57.81∗∗∗ 52.15
Insurance pays oﬀ 0.40 0.60∗∗∗ 0.53
Female 0.36 0.67∗∗∗ 0.56
Age 23.33 21.42∗∗∗ 22.08
Insurance pays oﬀ is a dummy equal to one if the forecasting error in a practice round was larger then
22.5/0.65=34.62, which is the break-even point (error) of the insurance for a fully rational risk-neutral de-
cision maker. Stars indicate mean diﬀerences signiﬁcant at 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) level. Standard
errors clustered at individual level in rows 1 and 2.
Table 3.2: Insurance choice
3.2 Regression analysis
We now turn to the eﬀect of insurance on self-conﬁdence and selection into insurance
based on self-conﬁdence by using parametric models. All regressions in table 3.3 use
OLS estimations and include session ﬁxed eﬀects.2 We start with performance in
the real eﬀort task in the ﬁrst column. We ﬁnd that having the insurance increases
2Ordered logit (for rank outcomes) and logit (for the overconﬁdent dummy) models yield very
similar results. The results are available on request.
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Figure 3.1: Distribution of variable rankdiﬀ.
the absolute forecasting error by 4 points (or 0.15 standard deviations). The same
diﬀerence is found between individuals who wanted and did not want insurance. The
ﬁrst eﬀect is moral hazard and the second adverse selection, two classic elements in
insurance markets (Shavell, 1979; Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976). Column 2 shows the
direct consequence of a lower performance in the task: both incentive and selection
eﬀects lead to a higher (i.e. worse) ranking within a session. Column 3 concerns the
rank that individuals guessed they are taking. Individuals who ultimately got the
insurance do no rank themselves worse or better than those who did not. In contrast,
the pure selection eﬀect in guessed ranks equals the one in true ranks. It follows in
column 4 that insurance increases the diﬀerence between individual's guessed and
actual rank by 2.7 ranks. Conditional on actual receipt, there exists no signiﬁcant
diﬀerence in self-conﬁdence between those subjects that wanted and did not want
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the insurance. This is in contrast to Sandroni and Squintani (2007), who assume
that overconﬁdent individuals are less likely to buy insurance, because they perceive
their risk to be lower than is actually the case. We ﬁnd that, on average, individuals
anticipate their performance in the task based on their skill level and adjust their
rank accordingly, but independent of the actual insurance status.
In the following we investigate if other biases speciﬁc to the experimental envi-
ronment drive our results. One explanation could be that not getting the insurance
despite wanting it leads to what is called "choking", a sudden decline of concentra-
tion and performance when individuals feel under pressure (Baumeister, 1984). This
could lead to a severe underestimation of own performance, independent of its true
level. Conversely, individuals receiving the insurance might feel lucky and thus rank
themselves better than they actually are. These two confounding factors imply that
the eﬀect of the insurance on self-conﬁdence should be larger among those individuals
who also wanted it. In our 2 by 2 design, we can test for this possibility. Column 5
of table 3.3 shows that the interaction term between wanting and actually receiving
the insurance is positive, but far from signiﬁcant. The main eﬀect of the insurance
is not signiﬁcant anymore, but the point estimate is similar to that in the columns
before.3 Column 6 includes gender and age as explanatory variables to check if these
explain the non-signiﬁcant selection eﬀect. Although the coeﬃcient turns positive,
it is not statistically signiﬁcant and only one-third of the insurance eﬀect. Columns
7 and 8 replicate columns 4 and 6 with a dummy equal to one if Rankdiﬀ is posi-
tive as outcome variable and we get qualitatively similar results. The occurrence of
overconﬁdence in ranking is increased by one-quarter under the insurance contract.
3This could also be due to lack of power, as the main coeﬃcient of HasInsurance now refers
to the insurance eﬀect in the group that did not want the insurance and this group comprises
only one-third of the sample. The insurance eﬀect in the group that wanted the insurance is still
signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
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(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii)
Outcome: Error True rank Guessed rank Rankdiﬀ 1{Rankdiﬀ > 0}
HasInsurance 4.088** 2.311** -0.649 2.960** 2.443 3.157** 0.240*** 0.251***
(1.729) (1.147) (0.872) (1.235) (2.137) (1.254) (0.082) (0.083)
WantsInsurance 4.032*** 3.081*** 3.303*** -0.222 -0.473 0.925 -0.016 0.042
(1.544) (1.177) (0.893) (1.262) (1.710) (1.400) (0.084) (0.091)
Has × Wants 0.729
Insurance (2.709)
Female -1.651 -0.016
(1.329) (0.080)
Age 0.391** 0.031***
(0.171) (0.010)
Constant 18.171*** 9.368*** 11.341*** -1.974 -1.943 -11.268** 0.296** -0.475*
(2.407) (1.730) (1.118) (2.174) (2.187) (4.793) (0.114) (0.263)
Session f.e. yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 1,670 167 167 167 167 167 167 167
Adj. R-squared 0.017 0.056 0.053 0.000 -0.006 0.028 0.032 0.074
Rankdiﬀ is the diﬀerence between the true and guessed rank of performance in the task. Individuals were incentivized
to guess their rank among all participants in their session with respect to their average performance in the 10 payoﬀ-
relevant rounds of the forecasting task. No feedback on performance was provided. Robust or clustered (column 1)
standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.10.
Table 3.3: Insurance and overconﬁdence
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4 Discussion
One major concern when trying to elicit self-assessment biases is to detect what
Benoît and Dubra (2011) call apparent overconﬁdence. If individuals are Bayesian
updaters and receive only a limited number of noisy signals on their performance,
they might rationally rank themselves better than others, while this is interpreted
as overconﬁdence by the researcher. This is less of a concern in our experiment, as
individuals do not receive any signal on their (or others') performance in the payoﬀ-
relevant rounds. Their ranking should therefore solely be based on the perceived
diﬃculty of the task over the ten rounds and an idiosyncratic component, which on
average is the same between those that get and do not get the insurance, conditional
on choice. Furthermore, Merkle and Weber (2011) demonstrate that the extent to
which apparent overconﬁdence poses a problem in the laboratory is limited.
Another concern may be an insurance-induced change in a potential hedging
motive when conﬁdence levels are elicited. Since insurance reduces the downside risk
in the real-eﬀort task, the hedging motive in the elicitation loses importance. As
a result, insured individuals could understate their performance less strongly than
non-insured. However, this would imply that the insured place themselves at better
ranks than the non-insured, which is not the case, as can be seen in column 3 of
table 3.3. Another change in placement behavior arises if participants anticipate
the lower performance of others, potentially induced by having insurance. Knowing
that others will perform worse, they can place themselves better in the conﬁdence
elicitation. However, such higher order thinking applies to both treatment groups
and should therefore be averaged out.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we reported results of a laboratory experiment in which losses from a
real eﬀort task could be reduced by purchasing an insurance. After subjects revealed
whether they want to be insured or not, insurance coverage was randomized. This
novel design allows us to disentangle selection from incentive eﬀects.
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Self-conﬁdence in the form of self-placement is measured as the diﬀerence between
an individual's true and self-assessed performance rank. We ﬁnd that, on average,
uninsured individuals underplace themselves, while those individuals that obtain
insurance have well-calibrated beliefs about their ability relative to others. While
the previous literature is concerned about selection, we are the ﬁrst to demonstrate
that incentives irrelevant in standard economic models can change self-conﬁdence
ex-post. Moreover, we ﬁnd no evidence for selection into insurance based on self-
conﬁdence.
Why does insurance coverage make individuals relatively less underconﬁdent in
their ability than uninsured individuals? One possible explanation suggested by our
regression analysis is that individuals do not anticipate the moral hazard that is
introduced by the insurance. Subjects do however anticipate their skill level and
adjust their rank estimate accordingly. Put diﬀerently, the eﬀect of the insurance is
not reﬂected in an adjusted ranking, while the selection eﬀect is. Another explanation
involves the perception of the diﬃculty of the task. Under insurance, the task could
appear easier, although in fact only the loss that subjects can incur in the real-eﬀort
task is lowered. As a consequence, underplacement is reduced. One can imagine
alternative psychological explanations: for instance, insurance could let individuals
focus more strongly on potential gains and thus the expected performance could
appear more gloomy.
Our results have implications for insurance markets. Take car insurance as an
example. Outside the laboratory it is next to impossible to distinguish between po-
tential moral hazard eﬀects and potential self-conﬁdence eﬀects. If both are present,
the optimal policy of the insurer should take both into account. Remedies against
moral hazard would not be enough to minimize unwanted behavioral tendencies,
when we assume that biased self-conﬁdence has negative consequences on driving.
The experiment in this paper also has its limitations. For reasons explained above
we do not have measures of self-conﬁdence before randomization of the insurance.
Further, we have no information on whether the induced self-conﬁdence translates
to other tasks and situations without insurance or on whether it is persistent or not.
Ultimately answering this puzzle will require further research on why individuals
16
become overconﬁdent in the ﬁrst place.
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Appendix A: Additional Figures and Tables
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Figure A.1: Distribution of forecasting errors in practice and payoﬀ-relevant rounds.
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Wants Insurance=1 Wants Insurance=0 Total
Has Insurance=1 0.922 0.794 1.000
Has Insurance=0 0.013 0.046 0.002
Total 0.151 0.050 0.019
Notes: Table shows p-value from t-test with the Null hypothesis that the mean of
rankdiﬀ equals zero within the respective cell.
Table A.1: P-values for zero mean t-test of rankdiﬀ
Group 1 Group 2 p-value
has=1 has=0 0.021
wants=1 wants=0 0.445
has=1 has=0 | wants=1 0.051
has=1 has=0 | wants=0 0.287
wants=1 wants=0 | has==1 0.862
wants=1 wants=0 | has==0 0.839
Notes: Table shows p-value from Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney test of a diﬀerence in rankdiﬀ between ex-
perimental groups.
Table A.2: P-values from Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test of pairwise diﬀerence in
rankdiﬀ
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Appendix B: On-screen instructions
24
Figure B.1: Stage 2: The real eﬀort task in practice rounds and following feedback.25
Figure B.2: Stage 3: Decisions whether to buy the insurance.
26
Figure B.3: Stage 4: Message on realized insurance status.
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Figure B.4: Stage 5: The real eﬀort task in payoﬀ-relevant rounds.
28
Figure B.5: Stage 6: Ranking of own performance within session.
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Appendix C: Experimental Instructions
Instructions are translated from German. Instructions were identical for all partici-
pants. Instructions from the second part of the experiment are not shown here.
Welcome to the experiment and thank you for your
participation!
Please stop talking with the other participants now
General procedures
In this experiment we study economic decision making. You can earn money by
participating. The money you earn will be paid to you after the experiment privately
and in cash.
The experiment takes about 1 hour and consists of three parts. At the beginning
of each part you will receive detailed instructions. If you have any questions about
the instructions or during the experiment, please raise your hand. An instructor will
then come to you and answer your questions privately.
Payment
You proﬁt will be denoted in points, where 10 points = EUR 1. In part I and II you
will have to solve multiple rounds. Which round of a part is payout relevant will
be randomly and with equal probability decided at the end of the experiment (part
III). Since you do not know which round will be drawn, it is optimal to behave as if
every round is payout-relevant.
At the end of the experiment your points will be converted into Euro and immediately
paid out to you in cash. For showing up on time you receive EUR 4 in addition to
what you will earn in the experiment.
Anonymity
30
The analysis of the experiment will be anonymous. That is, we will never link your
name with the data generated in the experiment. You will not lear n the identity of
any other participant, neither before nor after the experiment. Also the other partic
ipants will not learn your identity. At the end of the experiment, you have to sign
a receipt to conf irm the payments you received. This receipt will only be used for
accounting purposes.
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Part I
Task
In this part, we ask you to forecast the the price Y of a ﬁctitious stock. To do this,
you receive two values W1 and W2, which underlie the price of the stock. You will
not learn how exactly the price of the stock is formed out of the two values and a
possible constant. However, you will receive examples for this relation, which will
not change throughout the experiment. Please enter the predicted price of the stock
into the respective window on the screen and click on OK. You have 60 seconds for
this task. There are no advantages or disadvantages if you enter your solution faster
than 60 seconds. You cannot change your input after clicking on OK. You can enter
integer values between 1 and 500.
Procedure
At the beginning of the experiment you receive 100 points. 10 points are equal to
EUR 1. To get a feeling for the relationship of the stock with the two values, you
will once receive 10 examples at the beginning of the experiment on a piece of paper.
You then have 5 minutes to study these examples. You can keep them for the rest
of the experiment, but may not leave with them.
Next, you have the possibility to practice the task. There are 5 practice rounds with
60 seconds time each. After the ﬁve practice rounds you will be shown the true price
of the stock, your forecast and the deviation of your forecast. The practice rounds
do not inﬂuence your payout, but should help you in estimating your abilities for
this task.
After the practice rounds the task will be done ten more times. This time, the
accuracy of your forecast inﬂuences your payout. Every unit that your forecast
deviates from the true value leads to a reduction of 1 point.
At the end of the experiment, one out of the 10 rounds will be chosen randomly and
with equal probability. The forecasting error from this chosen round will be deducted
from your 100 points. If the error is larger or equal to 100 points, you receive no
payout from this part.
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Insurance
Before solving the task, you have the possibility to buy an insurance. This insurance
costs you once 22.5 points and is valid for all 10 rounds. The insurance reimburses
65% of your forecasting error. This means that, if you own the insurance, only 35%
of your forecasting error will be deducted from your points.
However, it is not sure if you receive the insurance. In a ﬁrst step you have to indicate
if you want to buy the insurance. If you want to buy the insurance, you will actually
receive it with a probability of 70%. With a probability of 30% you will not receive
it. In this case you also don't need to pay 22.5 points. The reverse holds, if you
indicate that you do not want to buy the insurance. With a probability of 70% you
will not receive it, and with a probability of 30% you will receive it nevertheless and
you have to pay 22.5 points.
After you decided for or against the purchase of the insurance, you will be informed if
you received it or not. Then the 10 rounds start. Only at the end of the experiment
will you know the correct value, your forecast and the deviation of your forecast.
None of the other participants will ever be informed about your forecast, your choice
or receipt of the insurance.
When choosing the insurance, you can activate a calculator by clicking on it symbol
in the lower right corner on the screen.
Payment
The payout-relevant round will be drawn at the end of the experiment. If you did
not receive an insurance, proﬁt from this part of the experiment will be
(100− |PriceStock − Forecast|)× 0.1EUR.
If you did receive the insurance your proﬁt will be
(100− |PriceStock − Forecast| × 35%− 22.5)× 0.1EUR.
If you do not enter any forecast within 60 seconds in a round and if this round
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is chosen as payout-relevant you do not receive any proﬁt from this part of the
experiment, even if you have the insurance.
Let's look at some examples.
Example 1
After the practice rounds you decide against buying the insurance. You receive the
message that you actually did not get the insurance. Now you perform the task 10
times. At the end of the experiment a random draw decides that round 7 is payout
relevant. The true price of the stock in this round was 122. Your prediction was 170.
The absolute diﬀerence of 48 will be deducted from your 100 points. Converted to
euros you will receive (100− 48)× 0.) = 5.2 Euro.
Example 2
After the practice rounds you decide to buy the insurance. You receive the message
that you actually did get the insurance. Now you perform the task 10 times. At
the end of the experiment a random draw decides that round 2 is payout relevant.
The true price of the stock in this round was 99. Your prediction was 105, so your
forecasting error equals 6. The insurance reimburses 65% of your error, or 3.9 points
which will be rounded to 4. Hence, only 2 points will be deducted from your 100
points. However the price of the insurance of 22.5 points will also be deducted.
Converted to euros you will receive (100− 6× 35%− 22.5)× 0.1 = 7.6 Euro.
Example 3
After the practice rounds you decide to buy the insurance. However you receive the
message that you did not get the insurance. Now you perform the task 10 times. At
the end of the experiment a random draw decides that round 10 is payout relevant.
The true price of the stock in this round was 150. Your prediction was 100. Since
you did not get the insurance a full 50 points will be deducted from your 100 points.
Converted to euros you will receive (100− 50)× 0.1 = 5 Euro.
Example 4
After the practice rounds you decide against buying the insurance. However you
receive the message that you did get the insurance. Now you perform the task 10
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times. At the end of the experiment a random draw decides that round 3 is payout
relevant. The true price of the stock in this round was 175. Your prediction was 125,
so your forecasting error equals 50. The insurance reimburses 65% of your error, or
32.5 points which will be rounded to 33. Hence, only 17 points will be deducted from
your initial 100 points. However the price of the insurance of 22.5 points will also be
deducted. Converted to euros you will receive (100 − 50 × 35% − 22.5) × 0.1 = 6.1
Euro.
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Examples for Part I
Here you ﬁnd 10 examples on the relation of the ﬁctitious stock Y and the two
values W1 and W2. The exact form of this relationship is identical in the examples,
the practice rounds and the payoﬀ-relevant rounds.
Y W1 W2
137 73 95
160 152 85
175 79 152
151 100 87
115 76 49
85 27 37
212 219 139
129 244 7
203 14 217
90 69 25
Please leave this paper on the table when you exit the room.
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